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Lawyers as Political Entrepreneurs? 
A Historical Perspective on the Contribution of Lawyers 
to Legal Integration in Europe 
Peter van den Berg 
1. Introduction 
At least since the birth of the republic of Rome, law and ‘lawyers’ have been 
of great importance in European societies. The purpose of this paper is to shed 
some light on their role, especially in relation to the process of state formation. 
It will, however, not cover the last two millennia completely. It will start with a 
paragraph on the growing importance of law and lawyers since the 11th cen-
tury, followed by a section containing a short overview of the various contribu-
tions of lawyers to the process of state formation until 1800. Subsequently, this 
essay will focus on a specific contribution of lawyers to the early modern 
European state: their part in the unification of private law. Two processes of 
legal unification will be described, based on the English and the French his-
torical developments respectively. In the last paragraph some concluding re-
marks on the significance of the past contribution of lawyers to legal integra-
tion for the development of the European Union will be made. These remarks 
should be regarded as being of a tentative nature. 
2. The Growing Importance of Law and Lawyers since the 11th Century 
In the thirteenth century the English cleric and judge Henry Bracton (1210-
1268) found it appropriate to state in his famous book on the laws of England 
that ‘in rege qui recte regit necessario sunt duo haec, arma videlicet et leges’.1 
“In a well governed kingdom”, Bracton wrote, “two things are indispensable: 
arms and laws.” It is significant that equal value was attributed to ‘laws’ as to 
arms. We have to realize that for a large part of the early Middle Ages aggres-
sive force was the dominant factor in life and that therefore weapons were of 
primordial importance to any ruler who wanted to enforce his will. In France, 
and elsewhere in Europe, feud was a very common way of coping with con-
flicts and violent self-help was ubiquitous.2 From the ninth century onwards 
Carolingian and Merovingian kings tried to establish peace in their country, 
                                                          
1  H. Bracton, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, Cambridge Mass.: Harvard 
University Press (1968); (G.E. Woodbine (ed.)), ‘introduction’). 
2  A. Harding, Medieval law and the foundations of the state, Oxford: Oxford Univer-
sity Press (2002), pp. 58-59. 
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using the [164] concept of law and justice, but their means of enforcing it 
turned out to be too shallow.3 The failure of the Carolingian kings did not 
mean that the whole concept of justice was lost, though. Like an Emmenthal 
cheese, there were pockets of justice, provided by monasteries, towns and 
other local entities, such as seigniorial courts. In England the problems were 
less grave and better dealt with. But on the whole there was a lot of violence in 
Europe: it was intrinsic to feudal aggrandizement.4
Only from the eleventh century onwards were kings able to successfully 
build their states. Kings managed to a certain extent to suppress violence in a 
process that could be called the spread of organized peace.5 This happened in 
close collaboration with the Church, where the idea of the peace of God had 
become very popular. Again, law was an important means. Conflicts tended to 
be increasingly solved with recourse to law. It is no coincidence that from 
1159 to 1303 every pope was a lawyer.6 In the beginning, this way of dealing 
with conflicts probably resembled more a process of negotiation than our pro-
cedure according to rules. Harding recently argued that justice was not only an 
essential feature of the state as we know it. In a way it preceded it, since the 
development of a functioning legal system created the state. Significantly, the 
word ‘state’ originally referred to a well-ordered state of affairs in a kingdom. 
In England, too, kings were rather successful in this respect, although violence 
was always just around the corner. In the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, 
therefore, law could be said to be of equal importance to weapons. The earlier 
quotation from Bracton illustrates precisely that. With the ascendance of law as 
a fundamental corollary of the state, lawyers became an important force in 
society. It is the purpose of this essay to describe in more detail the way they 
fulfilled this role. 
We have, however, to address a preliminary question first: whom should 
we regard as ‘lawyers’? This analysis will include anyone who had undergone 
a substantial training in law, either at a university of some sort or in a more 
practical environment, such as a court. We probably could also designate them 
as ‘jurists’. Of course some scholars have limited their study to the role of uni-
versity-trained lawyers, and for good reasons. Especially on the continent, at 
least in France and Germany, many legal practitioners had a university degree 
in law.7 Furthermore, the influence of canon law and Roman law since the 11th 
century is nowadays considered to be of exceptional importance to the devel-
opment of continental law. Since universities were an important vehicle of this 
influence, the so-called reception, a focus on the ‘Gelehrte Juristen’, the [165] 
                                                          
3  Ibid., 43. 
4  Ibid., 67. 
5  H.J. Berman, Law and revolution. The formation of the western legal tradition, 
Cambridge Mass.: Harvard University Press (1983), p. 90. 
6  R.W. Southern, Western society and the Church in the Middle Ages, Harmonds-
worth: Penguin Books (1982), pp. 131-132. 
7  In France and Germany a legal degree became a prerequisite for members of the 
judiciary rather early on. G. Buchda, ‘Gelehrte Richter’, in: Handwörterbuch zur 
deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (I), Berlin: Schmidt (1971), 1477-1481. 
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‘learned jurists’, is only logical. Literature on these ‘Gelehrte Juristen’ is 
abundant. Lieberich conducted extensive investigations into the university 
background of the members of the council of the Duke of Bavaria.8 It is not 
necessary to limit the kind of research to secular legal advisers, since particu-
larly in the later Middle Ages many of the recruited jurists belonged to the 
clergy, and were trained in canon law.9 Sporadically, a focus on university 
trained lawyers can also be encountered in England, for example in the study 
by Levack of civil lawyers, since for them a doctorate in civil law was a pre-
requisite.10 But in England such a limitation is less justified, since for most 
lawyers a university degree was not required. They were educated at the Inns 
of Court and Chancery, in an environment of practitioners. One should not, 
however, exaggerate the difference with the two universities that existed at that 
time, Oxford and Cambridge. The law school represented by the Inns of Court 
made use of an elaborate system of lecturing and was regarded by many as ‘the 
third university of England’.11
This does not cover the whole ground. Many young men went to university 
without getting a degree; many got legal training at a court without a formal 
examination. It is not easy to draw a line here: should they be regarded as ‘ju-
rists’?12 It is difficult to say. The important thing is to admit that history does 
not really like the sharp divisions we scholars tend to construct, so for the pur-
pose of this paper we had better include them as well. Another caveat, regard-
ing the content of legal education, might be appropriate. Whether a lawyer 
went to an Inn of Court or to a university, the education he received was most 
likely of a broad nature, including history, diplomacy and languages.13 We 
should not necessarily think of legal education as we know it today, at least on 
the continent: a rather juridical-technical training. 
With this broad definition of ‘lawyers’ we also avoid focusing on a group 
with a specific occupation.14 Karpik devoted his studies to the collective action 
of the French avocats and paid attention to their contribution to the process of 
                                                          
8  H. Lieberich, ‘Die Gelehrten Räte. Staat und Juristen in der Frühzeit der Rezep-
tion’, in: (1963) 27 Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte, pp. 120-189; and 
‘Klerus und Laienwelt in der Kanzlei der Baierischen Herzöge des 15. Jahrhun-
derts’, in: (1966) 29 Zeitschrift für bayerische Landesgeschichte, pp. 239-258. 
9  E. Genzmer, ‘Kleriker als Berufsjuristen im späten Mittelalter’, in: Études d’his-
toire du droit canonique Gabriel le Bras (2.), Paris (1965), pp. 1207-1236. W. 
Prest, ‘Introduction’ in: Id. (ed.), Lawyers in early modern Europe and America, 
London: Croom Helm (1981), pp. 11-15 (11), seems to suggest such a limitation. 
10  B.P. Levack, The civil lawyers in England 1603-1641. A political study, Oxford: 
Clarendon Press (1973). B.P. Levack, ‘The English civilians, 1500-1750’, in: W. 
Prest (ed.), op. cit., pp. 108-128. 
11  J.H. Baker, ‘The third university of England’ in: Id., The common law tradition. 
Lawyers, books and the law. London: Hambledon (2000), pp. 3-28. 
12  This question is also addressed by J.H. Baker, ‘The English legal profession, 1450-
1550’ in: W. Prest, op. cit., pp. 16-41. 
13  Ibid., p. 18. 
14  The same broad definition is used by W.J. Bouwsma, ‘Lawyers and early modern 
culture’, (1973) 78 The American historical review, pp. 303-327 (305). 
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[166] state formation.15 Bell and Landon investigated the political role of those 
who were, or had been, involved in private litigation as barristers.16 Dawson 
devoted himself to the study of the role of judges as ‘the oracles of the law’.17 
This is of course perfectly legitimate, since these scholars are specifically in-
terested in the importance of members of those professions. The purpose here 
is to sketch a more general picture of the role of jurists, regardless of whether 
they had pursued an academic career, had been civil servants or had been ac-
tive in yet another profession. 
Let me now turn to the main question: in what ways did lawyers contribute 
to the formation of states by means of law? The scope of this paper of course 
does not allow me to answer this question extensively. What I will do is first 
give an impression of the various roles lawyers played in this process between 
1100 and 1800, and then focus on their contribution to the introduction of a 
uniform (private) law in two European states: England and France. 
3. Lawyers and their Contribution to the Process of State Formation: An 
Overview 
The contribution of lawyers to states as we know them today is manifold. Kar-
pik argues that in France lawyers were instrumental in the first phase of the 
process of state formation.18 In the late Middle Ages kings tried to foster their 
legitimacy, particularly in their struggle with the powerful nobility. Avocates, 
and more generally jurists either lay or clerical, proved very useful: they be-
came important members of the king’s council. Legal training was especially 
important since court procedures tended to displace feuds. Conflicts between 
higher ranking persons were increasingly settled by law, instead of by force. 
The same is probably true of early Norman England, where the king became 
instrumental in solving disputes between his lords. From his council, the courts 
in Westminster Hall originated, giving opportunity to the judges to develop the 
common law. In Germany this process of ‘juridification’ of the king’s advisory 
councils can also be discerned, albeit somewhat later. In a sixteenth-century 
                                                          
15  L. Karpik, French lawyers. A study in collective action 1274 to 1994, Oxford: Ox-
ford University Press (1999). See for an extensive overview of comparative socio-
logical research into this profession, with a focus on the last two centuries: R.L. 
Abel & P.S.C. Lewis (eds), Lawyers in society [3 volumes], Berkeley/Los Ange-
les/London: University of California Press (1988-1989). 
16  D.A. Bell, Lawyers and citizens. The making of a political Elite in Old Regime 
France, New York/Oxford: Oxford University Press (1994). M. Landon, The tri-
umph of the lawyers. Their role in English politics, 1678-1689, Alabama: Univer-
sity of Alabama Press (1970). Cf. also: L.R. Berlanstein, ‘Lawyers in pre-
revolutionary France’, in: W. Prest (ed.), op. cit., pp. 164-180; and S. Harty, ‘Law-
yers, codification, and the origins of Catalan nationalism, 1881-1901’, (2002) 20 
Law and history review, pp. 349-384 and 397-399. 
17  J.P. Dawson, The oracles of the law, Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Law 
School (1968). 
18  Karpik (1999), op. cit., pp. 15-32. 
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[167] book on the recruitment of counselors, rulers were advised to use law-
yers: ‘Fürsten müssen der Juristerei brauchen, gleich wie das Schwert’.19 The 
German kings and other rulers, secular as well as clerical, followed this advice 
and started to employ Gelehrte Räte, which of course furthered the reception 
of Roman law.20 But the role of the lawyers at the highest level should not be 
overestimated. One has to realize that they were used by the king against a 
feudal nobility. They did not become leading politicians themselves. Jurists 
certainly occupied important positions and obtained the high social status that 
went with those positions, but they did not make the final political decisions. 
Most of the lawyers, as well as a considerable number of the other counselors, 
were for obvious reasons recruited from an intermediate social layer and con-
sequently there must have been a considerable social gap between them and 
the nobility, which was difficult to overcome.21
This is probably also the reason why their prominent role proved to be 
temporary. After some time, the policy of the French kings was successful and 
the lawyers became dispensable, at least with regard to the high offices.22 
From the sixteenth century onwards, the king increasingly relied for those of-
fices on the now pacified nobility, which was much better suited to the culture 
of the king’s court. This seems to be true for Germany as well.23 Moreover, 
Stolleis shows that at least in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries rulers 
were advised to use counselors of a more generalist educational background, 
with among other things a profound historical knowledge.24 To be sure, law 
and lawyers were still necessary to the political councils of Germany, but their 
contribution was more legal-technical, instead of politically directing.25
At another level, lawyers were also of crucial importance in the process 
that brought about the change from a violence-ridden society to a more peace-
                                                          
19  ‘Princes should use lawyers, just like they use swords’. R. Lorich, Wie iunge 
fursten, und grosser herrn kinder rechtschaffen instruirt und unterwisen (…) mögen 
werden, Marburg (1537). Cited in M. Stolleis, ‘Grundzüge der Beamtenethik 
(1550-1650)’, in: R. Schnur (ed.), Die Rolle der Juristen bei der Entstehung des 
modernen Staates, Berlin/München: Duncker & Humblot (1986), pp. 273-302 
(286). 
20  P. Moraw, ‘Gelehrte Juristen im Dienst der deutschen Könige des späten Mittel-
alters (1273-1493)’, in: R. Schnur, R. (ed.), op. cit., pp. 77-147; H. Lieberich, 
‘Gelehrte Räte’, in: Handwörterbuch zur deutschen Rechtsgeschichte (I), Berlin: 
Schmidt (1971), pp. 1474-1477; D. Stievermann, ‘Die gelehrten Juristen der Herr-
schaft Württemberg im 15. Jahrhundert. in: R. Schnur (ed.), op. cit., pp. 229-271; 
A. Kohler, ‘Zur Bedeutung der Juristen im Regierungssystem der Monarchia uni-
versalis Kaiser Karls V.’, in: R. Schnur (ed.), op. cit., pp. 649-674. 
21  Q. Griffiths, ‘New men among the lay counselors of Saint Louis’ Parlement’, 
(1970) 32 Mediaeval studies, pp. 234-272 (234). Stolleis (1986), op. cit., p. 283. 
22  Karpik (1999), op.cit., pp. 32-35. 
23  N. Hammerstein, ‘Universitäten – Territorialstaaten – Gelehrte Räte’, in: R. Schnur 
(ed.), op.cit., pp. 687-735 (734). Stolleis (1986), op. cit., p. 298. 
24  Stolleis (1986), op. cit., p. 287. 
25  D. Willoweit, ‘Rat und Recht im Regiment des Großen Kurfürsten von 1648 bis 
1658’, in: R. Schnur (ed.), op. cit, pp. 797-822. 
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ful one. ‘Good justice’, which meant just rules and correct, rational procedures, 
[168] became essential to the state, but it had yet to be invented. Since the state 
did not have the means to pay for the great number of experts necessary to 
provide this, the role of lawyers in litigation was vital. Procedures were adver-
sarial, which implied that on both sides of conflict, whether of a private or pub-
lic nature, private lawyers dominated.26 So even in procedures of a criminal 
nature, the state was rather passive, leaving it to the lawyers of both sides to 
argue their case. Lawyers had to provide the actual content of ‘justice’. As 
with their recruitment to high office, their dominant role at the level of court 
procedures also diminished as a result of its success, at least on the Conti-
nent.27 The moment law and procedures were sufficiently developed, the state 
changed the rules of the game. Trials became increasingly inquisitional, which 
meant that the influence of avocats diminished. 
For a while, the French avocats acquiesced in the loss of their access to 
higher positions and focused on private litigation.28 Avocats, and lawyers in 
general, were still of crucial importance to the state. Although we nowadays 
might tend to regard their role as merely ‘technical’, providing justice and 
solving conflicts remains a legitimizing factor even today. Moreover, many 
lawyers became civil servants in the slowly burgeoning bureaucracies. In sev-
enteenth-century France the Crown became increasingly dependant on legally 
trained administrators, the so-called intendants.29 The same is mutatis mutan-
dis true for Germany and England. 
The lawyers were, however, not ready to remain politically silent forever. 
In the seventeenth century, the kings started to strengthen their position on the 
basis of a theory of absolutism. In reaction, lawyers assumed the role of an 
opposing force. Lawyers were of eminent importance in the struggle [169] 
between king and parliament that dominated politics in seventeenth-century 
England.30 They were instrumental in ensuring that the lawful powers of the 
Crown remained within the limits set by parliament and the common law as 
they interpreted it. But it should be mentioned that not all lawyers sided with 
the opposition to the Crown. Many presented a case for the king on the basis of 
the same common law, as did, for example, Francis Bacon (1561-1626), Lord 
Chancellor from 1618 to 1621.31 Moreover, it has been argued that the crisis 
that eventually led to the acceptance of the Bill of Rights in 1689 was initiated 
by members of the nobility.32 Lawyers stepped forward later and played a par-
ticularly important role in formulating and passing the claim of rights. Even in 
respect to this claim, they were divided; some lawyers opposed such a project 
                                                          
26  Karpik (1999), op. cit., pp. 18-20 and 26-27. 
27  Ibid., p. 26. 
28  Ibid., 36-58. 
29  C.W. Brooks, ‘The common lawyers in England, c. 1558-1642’, in: W. Prest (ed.), 
op. cit., pp. 42-64 (58). 
30  Landon (1970), op. cit, pp. 248-250. 
31  Brooks (1981), op. cit, pp. 59-60. 
32  L.G. Schwoerer, ‘The role of lawyers in the Revolution of 1688-1689’, in: R. 
Schnur (ed.), op. cit., pp. 473-498 (474 and 491). 
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altogether. In eighteenth-century France, they also contributed substantially to 
the struggle between king and the parlements, claiming to represent ‘the pub-
lic’.33 Eventually, they constituted a political elite that took leadership of the 
Third Estate during the first stages of the French Revolution.34
Last but not least, lawyers proved to be instrumental in the legal integration 
within the various states. Once lawyers had played successfully played their 
role as advisors, as providers of law and as solvers of conflicts, other demands 
were made. It was argued that conflicts should not only be solved peacefully 
according to laws, but also that these laws should be uniform in order to ensure 
coherence within a state. It is to the contribution of lawyers in this respect that 
I will now turn. 
4. Two Processes of Legal Integration: England and France 
In the various European countries different processes of legal integration can 
be discerned. Two of them are, however, of particular interest, since they rep-
resent two opposing ways of dealing with the problem of legal diversity. In 
England legal integration was brought about by judges at an early stage. It was 
achieved in the course of the twelfth century by means of a central court in 
Westminster which dealt with the administration of justice. No use was there-
fore made of a codification, and legal writings hardly played any role. In 
France, on the other hand, the legal profession had to deal with diversity of law 
for many centuries. Legal unity was only brought about at the beginning of the 
nineteenth century. Unlike in the English example, it was attained at one stroke 
by way of a codification. It is true that at the same time a central court was 
introduced. The most important task of this court was, however, not to realize 
legal unity, but to safeguard the already uniform provisions of the code. Not-
withstanding considerable differences the development in most other Western 
European countries resembled the French example. 
4.1 The English Example 
England and Wales 
In 1066, when William the Conqueror crossed the Channel and started to rule 
as king of England, the situation as to the law probably resembled, to a greater 
or lesser extent, the one on the continent. Local customary law prevailed and 
was applied by local judges in procedures that were mainly oral. The result 
was diversity of law, since each region had its own customs. But politically the 
situation in England was rather different from the continental one. As conquer-
ors, the Norman kings were powerful rulers and their policies were not ham-
pered by a constitutionally protected autonomy of the various regions. The 
                                                          
33  Karpik (1999), op. cit., p. 59. 
34  Bell (1994), op .cit, p. viii. 
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result was extraordinary: England became the first European state to enjoy 
mone-[170]tary unity, an absence of internal tolls and even a sense of national 
togetherness.35 In the course of the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, the institu-
tions of William and his successors were also able to change the diversity of 
law. The royal courts in Westminster Hall proved to be of fundamental impor-
tance in this process.36 In the beginning, the competence of these courts was 
limited. They only dealt with important conflicts, for example where the king 
was involved, or where taxes were the issue, or where important members of 
the nobility were litigants. As it turned out, these courts were providing fairly 
good justice. The judges were professionals; procedure was written and ac-
cording to modern canonic and Roman measures. As a result, litigants sought 
in ever greater numbers to obtain justice from these courts, bypassing local 
judges.37 Consequently, local customary law had become obsolete in England 
a century before Bracton wrote his treatise. By then, royal common law already 
provided England with ‘a body of national law unique in Europe’.38
I would like to emphasize three aspects of this specific process of attaining 
legal integration. Firstly, it was as far as we know not preceded by any formal 
decision. Complete legal unity was almost certainly not the aim when the 
courts in Westminster came into existence. It should be noted that at first the 
competence of these judges was limited to important disputes between the 
great and wealthy. Many of the cases before these judges had a fiscal dimen-
sion. Secondly, it was brought about by judges who were not politicians, but 
men who spent most of their time on the administration of the nascent common 
law.39 Nor were these judges university trained men. Universities did not even 
exist at the early stages of the common law.40 When in the twelfth and thir-
teenth centuries Roman law was rediscovered and taught at the then new uni-
versities of Oxford and Cambridge, these judges might have gathered some 
knowledge of Roman law, but basically they remained professionals who were 
trained in practice. Thirdly, the success of this process was due to the weak-
ness of customary law at that time. Local customs did not amount to a corpus 
of modern law that was suited to deal with the complexities of an ever more 
dynamic society. It was not written, nor were its procedures up to the rational 
                                                          
35  B.P. Levack, The formation of the British state. England, Scotland, and the Union, 
1603-1707, Oxford: Clarendon Press (1987), pp. 10-11, 17 and 20-21; J. Brewer, 
‘The eighteenth-century British state. Contexts and issues’, in: L. Stone (ed.), An 
Imperial State at War. Britain from 1689 to 1815, London/New York: Routledge 
(1994), pp. 52-71 (61). 
36  J.H. Baker, An introduction to English legal history, London: Butterworths (1990), 
p. 14; Dawson (1968), op. cit., pp. 1-4. 
37  The supremacy of the royal courts must be kept in perspective, though, as Brooks 
(1981), p. 42, argues. There were at least until the seventeenth century many other 
courts administering their specific laws, among which were the ecclesiastical 
courts. 
38  Baker (1990), op. cit., p. 149. Dawson (1968), op.cit, p. 2. 
39  Dawson (1968), op. cit., p. 22. 
40  Ibid., p. 33. 
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standards that were raised by the examples of the developing canon law and 
the newly discovered Roman law. It was not an elaborated system, with the 
result that it did not [171] sufficiently cover areas of modern life. In short, it 
was not a sound legal system that was able to resist the justice of the king’s 
courts. 
The formal theory on the sources of the law was in accordance with the 
newly established central power. From the thirteenth century onwards, the au-
thority of the central government, king and parliament to regulate matters of 
law by means of statutes was not disputed. This constitutes a major difference 
with the situation in France, as will be shown shortly. Although, however, it 
seems that during the reign of Edward I the statutory instrument was exten-
sively used, in the end most of the law was to be made by judges.41 The scanty 
use of statutes in early modern England could be explained by the fact that 
another institution of central government, the courts in Westminster, already 
provided uniform law. 
The reliance on the law made by the central courts might also account for 
the way in which Welsh law was integrated in the English common law.42 Af-
ter the conquest of Wales in 1283, the English rulers were again confronted 
with legal diversity in their realm. Yet the local customs of Wales were not 
abolished. An attempt was made to codify some principles of English law and 
put these into force in Wales by means of statute, but these did not apply in all 
of Wales. Furthermore, the Westminster courts did not receive formal jurisdic-
tion in the newly acquired territories. As a result Welsh customs continued for 
a while. In the end, however, English law as provided by the royal courts in 
Westminster proved to be very influential. This resulted in the disuse of local 
Welsh customs and after some time legal unity was arrived at in practice. Only 
in 1536 were they formally – and posthumously – abrogated.43 Again, it was 
the weakness of the local customary legal system that enabled the development 
of a unified law. 
 
Scotland 
It is illuminating to compare this success story with the situation which re-
sulted from the union between England and Scotland in the seventeenth and 
eighteenth centuries.44 After the Union of 1604, which was a personal union, 
the new King James VI/I was confronted with legal diversity within his state, 
since England and Scotland had different legal systems. Not long after his as-
cendance to the throne of England, the King suggested to the House of Com-
                                                          
41  M.S. Arnold, ‘Statutes as judgments: the natural law theory of parliamentary activ-
ity in medieval England’, (1977/1978) 126 University of Pennsylvania Law Review, 
pp. 329-343. 
42  Baker (1990), op. cit., p. 37. 
43  Ibid., p. 37. Until 1830, however, there was no unified jurisdiction. A special set of 
courts, the ‘Great Sessions’, operated alongside the English courts. 
44  See on this union: W. Ferguson, Scotland’s relations with England: a survey to 
1707, Edinburgh: Donald (1977), pp. 97-116; Levack (1987), op. cit., passim. 
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mons that legal unification of England and Scotland be brought immediately 
by means of a codification.45 It was clear that this radical plan was initiated for 
[172] political reasons: it was closely linked to the wish of the King to estab-
lish a lasting union between the two kingdoms. Not surprisingly, there was 
much opposition to the attempts to realize legal unity. The Scottish Parliament, 
for example, severely limited the competence of its members of the commis-
sion charged with the negotiations on a treaty between England and Scotland. 
Some politicians and writers, both English and Scottish, pointed out that the 
attempt to realize complete legal unity was not only unnecessary, but also dan-
gerous.46 Even those who were convinced that unification of the laws of Eng-
land and Scotland was imperative in order to strengthen the union did not nec-
essarily support the idea of an immediate codification.47 In particular, some 
English advocates of legal unity expected that this unity would gradually 
emerge, in accordance with the previous example of the integration of Welsh 
law into English law.48 By 1608, it had become clear that as a result of the 
political opposition on the one hand and of the vision of attaining legal union 
gradually on the other, nothing would come of the plans of James VI/I. 
The gradual integration of Scottish law into English law did not, however, 
occur. On the contrary, in the seventeenth century Scottish law seems to have 
developed into a more or less complete legal system in its own right, with 
much resemblance to the family of civil law.49 Instrumental in this respect 
were the writings of Sir James Dalrymple of Stair, whose Institutions (1681) is 
often said to have ‘marked the creation of Scots law as we have since known 
it’.50 In view of the continued legal diversity it is probably not surprising that 
the project for a legal union between the two countries was revived in the 
1650s, after the defeat of the Scots by Oliver Cromwell, and again in 1664 and 
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1670, but nothing of these projects materialized.51 A final effort at attaining 
legal unity was made in 1707, when the separate kingdoms of England and 
Scotland were by treaty [173] united into one Kingdom of Great Britain.52 
Although a union of English and Scots law was on the mind of at least some 
politicians in circles of government, Articles 18 and 19 of Union specifically 
reserved to Scotland the laws and judicatures concerning private rights, which 
were not to be subject to incorporation.53
The treaty seemed to imply a different way of arriving at legal unity. Ac-
cording to it, the new kingdom would know only one Parliament, the Parlia-
ment of Great Britain. Sixteen Scottish peers were to sit and vote in the House 
of Lords of this Parliament. It was clear that this House of Lords was to con-
tinue to exercise an appellate jurisdiction over English superior courts.54 Its 
position vis-à-vis the Scottish judicature was less clear. As in England, the 
abolished Scottish Parliament used to have jurisdiction over Scottish courts. 
The Articles of Union did not, however, provide for a court to replace it. Soon 
after the start of the Union on 1 May 1707, it became evident that the House of 
Lords of the new, British parliament was to deal with appeals from the (Scot-
tish) Court of Session as well, and that these appeals were to be handled ac-
cording to Scottish law. As McLean argues, most of the commissioners were 
aware of the fact that this would happen.55 The English members did not ob-
ject because they were mostly in favor of legal union. Why did the Scottish 
members not insist on a provision in the Treaty of Union that would have pre-
vented this from happening? After all, they were warned by contemporary 
writers against the ‘danger of Scots law becoming English law “by the secret 
and certain operation of time”’.56 Moreover, among the thirty-one Scottish 
commissioners were nine eminent lawyers, whose influence on the Articles of 
the treaty affecting the laws and judicatures of Scotland would have been deci-
sive.57 As McLean shows, the answer to this question is that they feared the 
alternative: the introduction of a new, Scottish based appellate court that would 
be under the influence of the Crown. They preferred the House of Lords, 
which they thought would receive few cases from Scotland because of the 
physical distance. Consequently, the erosion of Scottish law was regarded as 
unlikely.58
In a way they were to be proved wrong. Scottish law has been strongly in-
fluenced by English law and – to a much lesser extent – vice versa. 59 Accord-
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ing to Evans-Jones, some judges in the House of Lords clearly saw the 
practi[174]cality of relying sometimes on the traditions of both Scotland and 
England for the formation of one law for Britain.60 The strategy to bring about 
complete legal union by means of a single Supreme Court, however, failed up 
to the present: the two legal systems are still quite distinct today.61 The failure 
to achieve legal unity might very well have resulted from the fact that around 
1700, Scottish law had already become an elaborated legal system which was 
able to successfully resist a take-over by English common law. After the depar-
ture of the Parliament in 1707, Scottish legal institutions such as the Court of 
Session and the Faculty of Advocates became the public and political forum of 
the nation, not unlike the parlements in eighteenth-century France.62 The 
eighteenth century has even been called by some the ‘golden age of Scots law’, 
in which it was able to develop in harmony with the ius commune of continen-
tal Europe.63 The establishment of a new Scottish Parliament in 1999 with its 
own legislative competences might in the future add to the distinctiveness of 
Scots law. The example of the legal history of Great Britain seems to lead to 
the conclusion that the English process is successful only when it is applied to 
a relatively weak legal system. 
4.2 France 
The kings of France were not as powerful as the Norman kings. Feudal disin-
tegration had been more profound than in England. The French kings were to a 
certain extent constitutionally bound to respect the autonomy of the various 
regions. It is true that after the kings had reestablished themselves, they en-
joyed an increasing political authority. At the end of the thirteenth century, 
there even developed out of the Curia Regis a central court, the Parlement de 
Paris.64 The exact constitutional position of the king was, however, constantly 
debated in the centuries to come. The king might have had the power and the 
opportunity to change at least partly the local coutumes, but for one reason or 
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another he did not fully exploit their initial weakness.65 On the contrary, the 
king chose to order the description of the local customs in order to provide 
sound justice. From the fifteenth century onwards, therefore, local governmen-
tal bodies were [175] working together with representatives of the king on a 
written text of the coutumes.66 Since the king offered to approve the result and 
to make the publication official by authorizing it, he was able to realize con-
siderable harmonization. In particular, the Canon law doctrine that customs 
which were contrary to principles of justice, the so-called ‘unreasonable cus-
toms’, could be changed was of great help. In the long run, however, the result 
was a fundamental legal diversity that was rather difficult to change. Whatever 
the precise status of local customs in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, 
from the fifteenth century onwards they became increasingly regarded as a part 
of the constitutionally guaranteed autonomy of the various provinces.67 This 
was especially true for customs regulating matters of private law. The provin-
cial parlements that were created since the middle of the fifteenth century were 
quick to assume their role as guardians of this ‘privilege’.68 It is true that in the 
seventeenth century royal ordonnances provided some legislation at a national 
level, but their scope was rather limited. Furthermore, these ordonnances did 
not automatically prevail over the local customary law, at least not in the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries.69 Consequently, it would take about three 
centuries before the diversity of law in France was replaced by legal unity. In 
this cumbersome process three phases can be discerned. In the first phase, 
which started in the sixteenth century, the so-called coutumiers took the lead. 
In the course of time, another type of lawyer contributed much to the develop-
ment of a droit commun: the systematizer. In the final phase the accomplish-
ments of the preceding centuries were transformed by the codifiers and put into 
the Code civil of 1804. 
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Coutumiers 
Immediately after the homologation or authentication of the local coutumes, a 
process that was successfully completed somewhere in the early sixteenth cen-
tury, commentators started to interpret them. There were many of these cou-
tumiers, since there were many different clusters of customary law. Some of 
them are quite famous, for example Charles Du Moulin (1500-1566). Du 
Moulin had studied law at the University of Poitiers, and spent most of his pro- 
[176]fessional days as a barrister in Paris. Others are hardly known even to 
legal historians, for example Joseph Boucheul (1639-1706), who was an avo-
cat at the court of Dorat, a town in the Haut Limousin. I will now describe the 
way these two coutumiers operated. 
It is important to realize that a specific local customary legal system consti-
tuted the core of their writings. The Coutumier general of Boucheul, published 
in 1727, was in fact a comment on the approximately 200 articles of the cus-
toms of Poitou in a numerical order. Boucheul started by giving the text of an 
article and subsequently elaborated on it very extensively. He sometimes 
needed more than 30 pages to comment on just one article. One of the reasons 
that it took him so many pages was that he also described in detail the matter at 
hand according to the law of the other regions of France, as well as according 
to Roman law. Obviously, the local customs were interpreted not just on the 
basis of the text and of the practice of the local courts. Coutumes of other re-
gions and their application by the competent courts, as well as Roman law, 
were also considered relevant in this respect. The same is true of Du Moulin, 
whose commentary on the Coutume de Paris, parts of which were published 
from 1539 onwards, bears witness to a profound knowledge of the coutumes of 
the various regions of France.70 It was really a work of comparative law: Du 
Moulin did not fail to mention in what respect the other coutumes were differ-
ent from the Coutume de Paris. 
In this context it is crucial to emphasize that both Du Moulin and Boucheul 
were in the first place practitioners, although they had studied law at a univer-
sity in their early days.71 In France, universities were not important with regard 
to the practice of law anyway, partly due to the fact that only Roman law and 
canon law was taught. The first chair in French law was established as late as 
1679. Consequently, the law schools had already been in decline for a long 
time.72 Furthermore, it is clear that they wrote their books for a market that 
mainly consisted of practitioners, that is avocats and judges. So obviously, 
there was an urgent practical need for books of this kind. 
The practical relevance of this kind of book can only be understood when 
one realizes that even with the homologation of the local customs, customary 
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law was still deficient.73 It was not yet the modern legal system needed to cope 
with the complexities of a modernizing society. One just has to look at the or-
der of Boucheul’s commentary to find out that it was not ‘a system’ at all. 
Many legal questions, therefore, could simply not be answered on the basis of 
local customary law alone. This deficiency was reflected in the then existing 
theory of sources of law. Although the regional customs were regarded as the 
primary source of law, partly due to the constitutional state of affairs, secon-
dary [177] sources were also admitted in the provincial courts. It became ac-
cepted that in the case of uncertainty or lacunae, recourse should be made to 
the customary law of neighboring regions. If an acceptable solution was still 
not available, Roman law was regarded as having persuasive authority. It can 
be concluded that notwithstanding their authorization by the king, local coutu-
mes were still relatively weak. They seem to have been, in more modern terms, 
somewhere between hard law and soft law.74 Provisions of the customary law 
of other regions and of Roman law were also acceptable, on account of their 
intrinsic value. 
 
Droit Commun Français 
It is not difficult to understand why this situation led to coutumes générales 
and eventually to something that could be called a ‘droit commun français’.75 
There was a strong practical need for the discipline known today as compara-
tive law. Moreover, one of the essential stages in the process of comparing 
various law systems is, according to Zweigert and Kötz, the development of 
general legal concepts suited to encompass and describe both systems.76 Law-
yers who tried to systematize the material provided by the coutumiers made an 
important contribution to the development of these concepts. To be sure, cou-
tumiers kept on writing and publishing their books until the end of the Ancient 
Régime and they certainly tried to put matters in some order, but they had 
company from lawyers who wrote more systemized treatises on the droit com-
mun français. The generalized coutumes were now put in a rather systemized 
order, sometimes using the divisions provided for by Roman law. In this way, 
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general rules of law were developed that fitted into a legal system. Let me just 
mention two famous authors R.-J. Pothier (1699-1772), who had studied law at 
the university of Orléans, and F. Bourjon (+1751), avocat at the Parlement of 
Paris from 1710. 
Pothier, who started working as a judge but became professor of law in 
1750, wrote a commentary on the Coutumes d’Orléans in 1740.77 Although a 
specific customary legal system was taken as a point of reference, it is interest-
ing to note that Pothier started with a scholarly, lengthy exposé on each title on 
[178] the basis of Roman law, the writings of Du Moulin and the Coutumes of 
various regions. The text of the provisions of the coutumes that were placed 
behind this introduction seem to have been hardly more than a appendix.78 
Bourjon was even more radical. In 1747 he published a book with the signifi-
cant title: Le droit commun de la France, et la coutume de Paris réduits en 
principes. It was arranged in a strict order, dividing the legal material into 
books, titles, sections and paragraphs. Although it paid a lot of attention to the 
Coutume de Paris, it did not reflect a specific legal system that was applied by 
courts somewhere in France. This approach might have somewhat limited the 
immediate practical relevance of the book. Bourjon at least felt obliged to an-
swer in the introduction the prospective objection that his book would be of 
scientific relevance only, especially interesting to legal scholars. It was never-
theless a commercial success: a third edition was published in 1773. The finest 
hour of these two more scholarly legal studies was, however, still to come. 
Precisely because of the less practical, more abstract nature of their works 
these two authors were extensively used by the codifiers, with the somewhat 
paradoxical result that they exerted the greatest influence on the French civil 
code of 1804, still in force today.79
 
Codification 
It should be made clear from the outset that although some kind of droit com-
mun français had been developed over the course of time, France did not enjoy 
legal unity at the eve of the French Revolution. Firstly, local customary law 
was still constitutionally protected and consequently the formal status of the 
droit commun, but also of the royal ordonnances, was relatively weak.80 Sec-
ondly, the droit commun had only substantial authority in northern France, in 
the pays de droit coutumiers. In the southern pays de droit écrit another legal 
system reigned, more influenced by Roman law. To put an end to this double 
diversity, a rather radical break was needed that would change the constitu-
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tional state of affairs. It became clear that such an upheaval was fundamentally 
a political matter. As it turned out, it even took a revolution to bring about the 
necessary changes. One of the most important credos of the revolutionaries of 
1789 became the necessity of a unitary state and therefore politicians were 
adamant in their plea for a uniform law.81 In the course of the revolution, legal 
unity was increasingly considered to be a matter of raison d’état. The obvious 
instrument [179] to bring about legal unity was a codification such as the Code 
civil. An important feature of that codification was and still is its exclusive 
force. With the introduction of this civil code all other sources of law, whether 
customary law or Roman law, were abolished. From that moment statutes, the 
written rules authorized by the government, reigned supreme. Thus codifica-
tion became a central element of the process of state formation. Not surpris-
ingly, the idea gained the support of leading politicians such as Sieyès and 
Napoléon, neither of whom were lawyers. Codification finally became feasible. 
The decision to codify French law was therefore clearly a political one, 
based on arguments derived from the raison d’état. Only after that decision 
was made, did lawyers come to the fore again.82 Although a lot of work had 
been done in the previous centuries, their task was far from easy. They not 
only had to forge into a single whole the diverse customs of the various regions 
of France, but they also were confronted with a division between the pays de 
droit coutumiers in northern France, and the pays de droit écrit in southern 
France, where Roman law had been more influential. In the end, four great 
lawyers managed to produce a draft of a codex that in 1804 became the civil 
code. All four of them were practitioners. J.-E.-M. Portalis (1745-1807), J. de 
Maleville (1741-1824), F.D. Tronchet (1726-1806) and F.J.J. Bigot de Pré-
ameneu (1747-1825) had all spent most of their time as avocats. The role of 
university scholars was again very limited, which is consistent with the – al-
ready noted – relative unimportance of universities for legal practice. 
The role of universities was to change dramatically after the introduction of 
the civil code, however. We have to realize that the professionals that had to 
apply the law, judges and avocats, were still thinking in terms of old law. Of 
course, the legislator tried to bully them into focusing on the provisions of the 
code, but he was only partly successful in this respect. It has been established 
that judges continued to apply the law as they knew it for at least some dec-
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ades.83 This is where the universities, established by Napoléon, became impor-
tant. At the universities law was increasingly taught in strict accordance with 
the new civil code. Some scholars realized that they were cutting themselves 
off [180] from ‘law’ in the broader sense of ‘justice’, and they sometimes de-
plored that, but they nevertheless felt obliged to teach law on the sole basis of 
the code civil. They became adherents of what has been called the ‘school of 
exegesis’.84 This proved to be instrumental for the success of the French civil 
code. 
5. Law, Lawyers and the European ‘State’ 
Now it is time to assess the significance of the contribution of lawyers to legal 
integration for the development of the Euro-[181]pean Union (EU). It has be-
come quite clear that at least since the time Bracton wrote his treatise, arms and 
laws were of equal importance to the developing states of Europe. The EU 
seems to take a somewhat different route. It obviously lacks ‘weapons’: it has 
neither an army, nor a police force to speak of. It should not surprise us, there-
fore, if laws, and consequently lawyers, play a more significant role in the 
formation of this union than in the earlier cases of state formation. Profound 
descriptions of this – probably predominant – role of law in the EU can of 
course be found by the other contributors to this volume. I will only point to 
some possible parallels between the historical function of law and lawyers and 
the present use of law and lawyers in the context of the EU. Again, most atten-
tion will be devoted to the role of lawyers in the unification of private law. 
5.1 Lawyers and the European State: An Overview 
At least three possible parallels deserve some attention in this paragraph. 
Firstly, it was fundamental to the development of the early European states that 
they were able to present themselves as providers of better justice. These new 
states were not only increasingly successful in enforcing legal decisions, but 
they also emphasized the higher, more reasonable nature of their justice. This 
development was of course detrimental to local entities. Local courts and cus-
tomary law were slowly but surely dismantled. The nascent European state 
could also use this strategy and try to directly win the hearts and minds of the 
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European people. It is not difficult to notice the efforts to incorporate the 
European Convention on Human Rights and the consequent case law into the 
system of the European Union. It started with the application of these human 
rights on the basis of Article 6 (2) EU.85 The next step was the proclamation of 
the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union in December 
2000.86 The final stage should be the adoption of the European Constitution, 
which would effectively integrate these human rights within the treaty system 
of the European Union.87 All this could have the effect that the EU morally 
surpasses the member States. Obviously this would be detrimental to the moral 
authority of the member States as supreme providers of justice. Such a strategy 
of course gives a rather political dimension to the role of lawyers in both the 
European Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Justice (ECJ).The 
contribution of Solanke to this volume, describing the efforts of lawyers of a 
network of NGOs to combat racial discrimination, seems to provide us with a 
fine example of the importance of the concept of justice for the emerging 
European State. As Solanke points out, it is rather significant that these law-
yers have chosen to target the European Commission in an effort to bring 
about a so-called Race-Directive. It is less surprising that their efforts were 
quickly supported by another European institution: the European Parliament. 
The attention devoted to consumer protection and product liability by insti-
tutions of the European Union should perhaps also be seen in the perspective 
of a Union as a provider of justice. This might be true as well for the vast 
amounts of environmental legislation, mentioned in Stout’s contribution to this 
volume. The European Union is proving its existence with an enormous 
amount of legislation, on an ever-increasing number of fields. These efforts of 
the Union are necessarily reflected by the employment of many lawyers. It is 
obvious that they are of great importance in the European bureaucracy. Stout 
clearly shows that these lawyers in European employment have accelerated this 
development, at least in the field of the environment. They tend to create work 
for themselves, resulting in even more legislation. ‘I legislate, therefore I am’ 
seems to have become the credo. 
Secondly, in periods of major constitutional change such as the English 
seventeenth century, lawyers clearly gained tremendously in political rele-
vancy. Especially in the ‘Aufbaufase eines neuen Staates’, that is in a state 
under construction, they were instrumental in answering political questions in a 
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quasi-legal context.88 The constitutional uncertainty resulting from the devel-
oping European state has again pushed lawyers to the fore. The role of lawyers 
is of course instrumental where vital documents are prepared, such as treaties. 
Undoubtedly, their influence on the wording of the recent proposal for a new 
European constitution has been great. Moreover, they become even more im-
portant when such treaties come into force. Then, they will have to discuss and 
decide many legal questions of a clearly political nature. What is the precise 
content of the legislative and other competences that have been attributed by 
the consecutive treaties to the European institutions? What exactly is the status 
[182] of regulations and directives? How detailed are they allowed to be and 
what are the consequences for the (concurrent) competences of the member 
States?89 There is no doubt that the lawyers of the ECJ are of primordial im-
portance in this respect.90 At least some decisions of this Court cannot be re-
garded as merely legal-technical. I only have to mention the well-known case 
Van Gend and Loos, in which the Court decided that, with the treaty of Rome, 
a new legal order had been created, surpassing the various national legal orders 
of the member States.91 Schepel and Wesseling have argued that these judicial 
policies are embedded in a rather homogeneous community of writers on 
European law.92 Interestingly, this kind of ‘judicial activism’ is sometimes 
defended by stating that to ensure individuals ‘a maximum of judicial protec-
tion’ belongs to the ‘core of any judicial activity’.93 Governments of member 
States are now fully aware of the importance of the decisions of the ECJ and 
participating in them has become a preferred means to influence the direction 
of case law, as is recently shown by the research of Granger.94
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A third historical parallel could be discerned in the context of the opposi-
tion to the development of the EU into a true state. Lawyers might assume an 
important role here, as they did in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries 
against the emerging royal absolutism. For a long time, most national lawyers 
have been rather indifferent to the constitutional developments that have ac-
companied the growth of the European Union. It seems that only the proposal 
for a European Constitution has been able to incite a more fundamental discus-
sion. This could also result in a more profound opposition, questioning the 
legal basis of a supposed transfer of sovereignty from the member States to the 
Union. Lawyers and particularly judges in the national courts are of vital 
im[183]portance in this respect, since the implementation of European law is 
ultimately in their hands. Alter argues that they have by and large been suppor-
tive of ECJ policies.95 It has also been suggested, however, that some national 
courts are showing signs of resistance, for example in the context of Art. 234 
(=177 old) EC. This provision obliges the highest national court to have ques-
tions relating to the construction of the Treaty answered by the ECJ. As Urban 
argues, the European Court has for obvious reasons tried to limit the discre-
tionary freedom of national courts in this respect.96 National courts were not to 
become ‘full players’ with regard to the interpretation of the Treaty. But as 
Blaurock points out, the German Bundesgerichtshof has since the 1980s been 
trying to avoid putting prejudicial questions to the European Court.97 Resis-
tance within the German judiciary to the supremacy of the ECJ also became 
manifest in 1994, in a much discussed decision of the Bundesverfassungs-
gericht.98 In that ruling, the German Constitutional Court denied that the ECJ 
could legitimately be held to have competence over its own competence.99
5.2 Lawyers and the Unification of European Private Law 
Since in this paper the focus has been on the contribution of lawyers to legal 
integration by means of a uniform (private) law, let me dedicate some final 
remarks to this issue. I have described two processes in which lawyers acted as 
providers of uniform law, an English and a French process. What is the rele-
vance of these processes for the development of a unified European private 
law? 
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The English Scenario 
The English scenario would require a central European court, for example the 
ECJ, which would increasingly be involved in matters of private law. Not 
many writers have proposed this scenario as a probable way of arriving at a 
unified European private law, with perhaps the exception of Van Gerven.100 
Of course, the idea of a central European Court with competence in matters of 
private law [184] has been put forward, but usually as a necessary complement 
to that other way of achieving legal unity: codification.101 Lando, the well-
known chairman of the commission that brought about the general rules of 
Contract Law (the so-called PECL), even explicitly refers to the failure of real-
izing legal unity between England and Scotland to stress the importance of a 
codification.102 Riedl, however, seems to hope that the European judiciary will 
play such a major role in bringing about the Europeanization of private law, 
using the PECL as formulated by the Lando commission.103 Whether this is a 
viable option is rather questionable. The historical example of England shows 
that this scenario is particularly successful when the legal systems that have to 
be replaced are relatively weak. Only ‘soft’ local English and Welsh legal sys-
tems gave way to the law of the Westminster courts. Already in the seven-
teenth century, the Scottish legal system proved to be too developed to be 
swept away by such a method. The various legal systems of the member states 
of the EU are much more developed than the Scottish system at that time. 
Moreover, they are supported by powerful institutions such as national courts 
and bar associations, and often even codified. Finally, it should be emphasized 
that the European Court does not have the political backing it would need to 
assume a greater competence over conflicts of a private law nature. 
 
The French Scenario 
The French scenario of unifying private law is more complicated and therefore 
its application to Europe needs more attention here. Essentially, it should con-
sist of two elements. The first requirement would be the development of a 
European droit commun by means of an extensive use of the methods of com-
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parative law. Secondly, when such a droit commun has been more or less real-
ized, a European codification would be needed. 
Ideally, this European droit commun should be developed by writers who 
are closely linked to legal practice, as happened in France. They should use the 
legal material of the various member States, as well as the European rules 
which have an impact on private law. They should preferably have been barris-
ters or judges for many years. One of the reasons why this is important is that 
according to this scenario the newly developing droit commun should be ap-
plied by national courts. In the last decade or two, this approach has been in 
some form or another on the minds of many lawyers, especially those with a 
[185] background of comparative law or legal history.104 Famous academics, 
such as Zimmermann, who rightly points to the relevance of Roman law for a 
ius commune, and Coing are among them.105 Some writers also acknowledge 
the essential role of the national judges in this process.106 A lot of work has 
already been carried out on the drafting of a European private law by lawyers, 
as the contribution of Schreiner to this volume clearly shows. I have already 
mentioned the PECL of the Lando commission.107 In 1994 the Trento Project 
was started, directed by Bussani and Mattei and designed to develop a common 
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core of European private law’.108 Van Gerven, in cooperation with many oth-
ers, launched in 1994 a project of casebooks for a common law of Europe.109 
The Study Group on a Civil Code, also called The Von Bar-group after its 
chairman, commenced its work in 1999.110 There is also a ‘European Group 
on tort [186] law’, with its headquarters in Tilburg. This so-called Tilburg 
Group has already published several volumes on ‘principles of European tort 
law’.111 It is hardly surprising that the EU has financially supported some of 
these groups. 
I am not sure whether these pioneers are really following the footsteps of 
Dumoulin and the other coutumiers. For a start, their point of departure seems 
to show some important differences from the situation in which their predeces-
sors found themselves in Ancien Régime France. The national systems of today 
are not deficient in the way the French customary legal systems were. The law 
of the member states is written, systematized and covers most areas of life in a 
very detailed manner. Moreover, it is taught and applied by firmly established 
national institutions, such as universities and courts. In short, the national law 
systems consist, unlike the French customary law systems of the seventeenth 
and eighteenth centuries, of hard law. After all, that is the reason why Finnish 
law does not have any formal authority in the courts of Spain. 
Some writers argue that the development of a uniform private law should 
result from competition of legal rules. Smits, for example, expresses the hope 
that national courts will receive legal rules of foreign countries or parts of the 
developing droit commun on the basis of their persuasive authority, because 
these rules provide ‘better law’.112 However, unlike the legal systems of early 
modern France, the demand for ‘better law’ is likely to be limited in modern 
legal systems due to the fact that they are intrinsically well suited to coping 
with new legal challenges. As a result of this different point of departure, it is 
questionable whether national judges will apply the developing European droit 
commun. The remarks of Niglia on the application by judges of directives in 
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the field of private law do not appear to be very promising.113 He states that as 
a result of judicial disregard of the directives national courts have preserved 
the traditional body of legal precepts. The conclusions reached by Lee in his 
contribution to this volume seem to confirm this. He argues that the institutions 
of the EU are now highly developed and consequently are able to contribute 
significantly to legal integration, in accordance with the theory of neofunction-
alism. He also clearly states, however, that especially in the field of private law 
directives have become the object of national resistance. Directives run the risk 
of suffering the same fate as the royal ordonnances in seventeenth and 
eight[187]eenth-century France. The resulting lack of penetration of EU law 
into the private law systems of the member States proves that the nation states 
have retained considerable sovereignty. Law firms obviously realize this since 
they still emphasize representation on a national level. 
The lack of immediate relevance for legal practice is in some ways re-
flected in the work as well as the background of most of the pioneers. Their 
writings usually do not comment on other legal systems from the perspective 
of their own, as in the French scenario. Most of them have left out this phase 
and have moved on directly to formulating general principles. Furthermore, the 
pioneers have concentrated on specific fields of law, especially contract law. 
Neither are these deviations from the French scenario surprising from a practi-
cal point of view. Firstly, there is no obvious demand for extensive legal litera-
ture on a comparative basis in the national legal practices. More importantly, 
the national legal systems of today are so elaborate that an endeavor according 
to the original process would require an immense effort. The Dutch civil code 
consists of at least 2,000 provisions, which would all need to be commented 
upon on the basis of the provisions of twenty odd other national legal systems. 
I do not dare to imagine the number of pages needed for a complete description 
of and comparative comment on Article 6: 162 of the Dutch civil code, which 
covers tort. In France, admittedly, a dominant role was attributed to the cou-
tume de Paris and this made things a little less complicated. But it would be 
hard to determine which national legal system should play the same part in the 
European droit commun. 
As to their background, most of the pioneers are not practitioners, as was 
the case in the French scenario. As also observed by Schreiner, the majority of 
participants working on the projects concerned with European law are academ-
ics. This could be a result of the lack of demand in practical circles for legal 
products on a comparative footing, but some writers also have more or less 
attributed the task of developing a European common law to scholars.114 Of 
course, some scholars realize the importance of a tight connection between 
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comparative legal writing and legal prac-[188]tice.115 It is, however, question-
able whether this connection can be established in view of the hard national 
legal systems. It has been suggested that legal education might have to play a 
considerable part in this respect.116 Some law schools have already started 
with a curriculum that is for the most part based on courses of comparative 
law, despite the fact that this could put in danger the collaboration between 
legal writing and legal practice. Academic lawyers, who in an attempt to reach 
for the heights of comparative law pay too little serious attention to the law of 
the state in which they work, jeopardize the relevance of academic law for 
legal practice.117 This is illustrated by the fate of legal education at the French 
universities during the Ancien Régime. These law schools focused almost ex-
clusively on Roman law and created thereby a yawning gap between theory 
and practice, which contributed greatly to their decline. The American experi-
ence is interesting in this respect. Friedman and Teubner have argued that na-
tional law schools teaching law on the basis of a national curriculum only de-
veloped in the United States as a response to the mobility of lawyers across 
state lines.118
Let us suppose that the approach of these pioneers will be as successful as the 
French scenario and lead to a European droit commun comparable to its French 
counterpart. Even then a European code would be required, since a codifica-
tion constituted the second indispensable element of the French scenario. In 
1800, the efforts of the coutumiers had not resulted in a uniform French private 
law. Not only was the force of the droit commun mainly limited to the northern 
pays de droit coutumiers, the South of France being submitted to rules of pri-
vate law that were heavily influenced by Roman law. But even within the 
northern territories, the legal diversity resulting from the prevalence of local 
customary law was still considerable. The droit commun was only a subsidiary 
source of law, albeit with great authority. The development of a European ius 
commune will at best result in such a situation. The civil code systems might to 
some extent have grown together, but there still will remain considerable dif-
ferences. Furthermore a more clear-cut division with the Common law system 
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might remain. To realize further legal unity in Europe a codification would be 
required. 
The idea of a European codification of private law has of course attracted 
the attention of many lawyers and indeed some support as well. Significantly, 
some advocates of a European civil code can be found among those already 
working on the development of a European droit commun. Lando fears that 
such an unwritten droit commun will not lead to legal unity within a reasonable 
time. He is convinced that only a codification of, for example, the PCEL can 
provide that unity.119 Mattei of the Trento Project recently insisted on an im-
mediate codification, because in his view unification through ‘soft law’ will 
[189] lead to the loss of the values of the European social model of capital-
ism.120 It is hardly surprising that lawyers have also considerably contributed 
to the opposition to the idea of a European Code.121 Moreover, they have tack-
led the issue of a legal basis for a European civil code, in particular whether 
the authority of the EU institutions allows such an endeavor at the moment.122
Notwithstanding, however, the obviously important role of lawyers in the 
debate on the possibility of a European civil code, as well as in the prepara-
tions thereof, I would like to emphasize that the ultimate decision will not be 
theirs. As in the French process, such a decision involves the very constitution 
of the future European state, whether it be predominantly unitary or not. Since 
this is an issue of a profoundly political nature, I would posit that it will be 
decided by politicians, as in France at the end of the eighteenth century. Some 
politicians in the European arena have already addressed the issue, as the deci-
sions of the European Parliament and the communication of the European 
Commission show.123 Given the considerable sovereignty retained by the 
member States, however, it is highly unlikely that a uniform codification of 
private law will be decided upon at a European level in the near future. 
6. Epilogue 
In this paper I have addressed the various contributions of lawyers to the proc-
ess of state formation. I have attempted to describe the role of these lawyers 
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independently of an evaluation of the various processes of state formation it-
self. Such an evaluation has not been the issue here, not even of the process of 
state formation at a European level, as we are witnessing in our time. Whatever 
the verdict over these processes, it has become clear from my description that 
the contribution of lawyers to these processes has been considerable. They not 
only did their share on a more or less technical level, but occasionally were 
very influential on an intermediate, more political level. Especially in periods 
of constitutional uncertainty and change, they were able to come to the fore, as 
is illustrated by the avocats in medieval France, the English judges who forged 
the common law and recently the judges of the European Court of Justice. 
Notwithstanding, however, the fact that these lawyers could therefore – par-
ticularly when operating on this intermediate level – be regarded as ‘political 
en-[190]trepreneurs’, it should be noted that their role was usually not politi-
cally decisive. As is also shown by the history of legal integration in France, 
more often than not major political decisions are made by politicians without 
legal training. 
 
 
